

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Plaintiff,**

**v.**

**Criminal Case No: 1:15-cr-11**

**SAMANTHA CHRISTOPHER,  
Defendant.**

**OPINION/REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
REGARDING PLEA OF GUILTY IN FELONY CASE**

This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge by the District Court for purposes of conducting proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Defendant, Samantha Christopher, in person and by counsel, Brian Kornbrath, appeared before me on February 12, 2015. The Government appeared by Shawn Morgan, its Assistant United States Attorney. The Court determined that Defendant would enter a plea of “Guilty” to a one-count Information.

The Court proceeded with the Rule 11 proceeding by placing Defendant under oath.

The Court determined that Defendant’s plea was pursuant to a written plea agreement, and asked the Government to tender the original to the Court. The Court asked counsel for the Government if the agreement was the sole agreement offered to Defendant. The Government responded that the stipulation had been modified to allow Defendant to challenge the total loss amount. Counsel for Defendant stated that he had discussed this change with Defendant. The Court asked counsel for the Government to summarize the written plea agreement. Defendant stated that the agreement as summarized by counsel for the Government was correct and complied with her understanding of the agreement. The Court **ORDERED** the written plea agreement filed and found the requirements of Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), to be satisfied.

The Court then inquired whether Defendant was a citizen of the United States. Defendant responded that she was a citizen. The undersigned asked Defendant whether she understood that if she were not a citizen of the United States, by pleading guilty to a felony charge she would be subject to deportation at the

conclusion of any sentence; that she would be denied future entry into the United States; and that she would be denied citizenship if she ever applied for it. Defendant stated that she understood.

Thereupon, the Court inquired of Defendant concerning her understanding of her right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept the entry of her guilty plea and her understanding of the difference between an Article III Judge and a Magistrate Judge. Defendant stated in open court that she voluntarily waived her right to have an Article III Judge hear her plea and voluntarily consented to the undersigned Magistrate Judge hearing her plea, and tendered to the Court a written Waiver of Article III Judge and Consent To Enter Guilty Plea Before the United States Magistrate Judge, which waiver and consent was signed by Defendant and countersigned by Defendant's counsel and was concurred in by the signature of the Assistant United States Attorney appearing.

Upon consideration of the sworn testimony of Defendant, as well as the representations of her counsel and the representations of the Government, the Court finds that the oral and written waiver of Article III Judge and consent to enter guilty plea before a Magistrate Judge was freely and voluntarily given and the written waiver and consent was freely and voluntarily executed by Defendant, Samantha Christopher, after having had her rights fully explained to her and having a full understanding of those rights through consultation with her counsel, as well as through questioning by the Court. The Court **ORDERED** the written Waiver and Consent filed.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge inquired of Defendant and her counsel relative to Defendant's knowledge and understanding of her constitutional right to proceed by Indictment and the voluntariness of her Consent to Proceed by Information and of her Waiver of her right to proceed by Indictment. The undersigned then read the information to Defendant. Defendant and her counsel then verbally acknowledged their understanding and Defendant, under oath, acknowledged her voluntary waiver of her right to proceed by Indictment and her agreement to voluntarily proceed by Information. Defendant and her counsel executed

a written Waiver of Indictment. The undersigned Magistrate Judge then received and **ORDERED** the Waiver of Indictment and the Information filed and made a part of the record herein.

The undersigned then reviewed with Defendant the elements of the charge in the information the United States would have to prove at trial, charging her with embezzlement, theft, and conversion of government monies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. The undersigned reviewed with Defendant the statutory penalties applicable to an individual adjudicated guilty of the felony charge contained in the Information. From said review the undersigned Magistrate Judge determined Defendant understood the nature of the charge pending against her; understood that the possible statutory maximum sentence which could be imposed upon her conviction or adjudication of guilty on that charge was imprisonment for a term of not more than ten (10) years; a fine of not more than \$250,000.00, or both imprisonment and a fine; and a term of supervised release of three (3) years. Defendant also understood that mandatory restitution was required pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. Defendant further understood the Court would impose a special assessment of \$100.00 for the felony conviction payable before the date of sentencing and understood that the Court may require her to pay the costs of her incarceration and supervised release.

The Court then inquired of Defendant regarding her understanding of her conditional waiver of appellate rights as contained in the written plea agreement, as follows:

Ct. Do you understand that under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, you have a right to appeal any conviction and sentence that is imposed against you?

Def. Yes.

Ct. Do you understand also that you have a right to collaterally attack or challenge your sentence by filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that's commonly called a writ of habeas corpus motion?

Def. Yes.

Ct. Did you discuss those with Mr. Kornbrath?

Def. Yes.

Ct. Do you understand that under your plea agreement, provided the District Judge gives you a sentence within the statutory maximum, you are waiving or giving up your right to appeal the actual sentence the District Judge imposes?

Def. Yes.

Ct. And you are also giving up your right to collaterally attack or challenge it by filing a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Def. Yes.

Ct. Did you intend to give up those rights as set forth in paragraph 12 of your plea agreement?

Def. Yes.

Ct. Has anything about your understanding changed since you and Mr. Kornbrath talked about it and today?

Def. No.

Ct. The only thing you've reserved to yourself under that paragraph is to pursue a claim of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel if you discover such a claim may exist or evidence of such a claim exists after today.

Def. Yes.

Ct. Do you know of any prosecutorial misconduct as you sit here today?

Def. No.

Ct. Do you know of any ineffective assistance of your counsel, Mr. Kornbrath, as you sit here today?

Def. No.

Upon consideration of all which, the Court finds Defendant understood her appellate rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights pursuant to the condition in the plea agreement.

Defendant thereafter stated in open court she understood and agreed with the terms of the written plea agreement as summarized by the Assistant United States Attorney during the hearing, and that it contained the whole of her agreement with the Government and no promises or representations were made to her by the Government other than those terms contained in the written plea agreement. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further examined Defendant relative to her knowledgeable and voluntary execution of the written plea bargain agreement signed by her and determined the entry into said written plea agreement was both knowledgeable and voluntary on the part of Defendant. The Court further determined that Defendant was competent to proceed with the Rule 11 plea hearing.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge inquired of Defendant, her counsel, and the Government as to the non-binding recommendations and stipulations contained in the written plea bargain agreement and determined that Defendant understood, with respect to the plea bargain agreement and to Defendant's entry of a plea of guilty to the felony charge contained in the Information, the undersigned Magistrate Judge would write the subject Report and Recommendation and would further order a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the probation officer attending the District Court, and only after the District Court had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence investigation report, would the District Court adjudicate the Defendant guilty of the felony offense contained in the Information and make a determination as to whether to accept or reject any recommendation or the stipulation contained within the plea agreement or pre-sentence report. The undersigned reiterated to the Defendant that the District Judge may not agree with the recommendations or stipulations contained in the written agreement. The undersigned Magistrate Judge further advised Defendant, in accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, that in the event the District Court Judge refused to follow the non-binding recommendations or stipulations contained in the written plea agreement and/or sentenced her to a sentence which was different from that which she expected, she would not be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant and her counsel each acknowledged their understanding

and Defendant maintained her desire to have her plea of guilty accepted.

Defendant also understood that her actual sentence could not be calculated until after a pre-sentence report was prepared and a sentencing hearing conducted. The undersigned also advised, and Defendant stated that she understood, that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and that, even if the District Judge did not follow the Sentencing Guidelines or sentenced her to a higher sentence within the statutory maximum than she expected, she would not have a right to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant further stated her attorney showed her how the advisory guideline chart worked but did not promise her any specific sentence at the time of sentencing. Defendant stated that she understood her attorney could not predict or promise her what actual sentence she would receive from the sentencing judge at the sentencing hearing and that she would not have the right to withdraw her guilty plea if her actual sentence was different or greater than her attorney may have projected during his explanation of the guidelines. Defendant further understood there was no parole in the federal system, although she may be able to earn institutional good time, and that good time was not controlled by the Court, but by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

The Court heard the testimony of Special Agent Anthony Branch of the United State Postal Service's Office of the Inspector General. Special Agent Branch testified that when the events charged in the Information occurred, Defendant was a clerk at the United State Postal Service's contract station in Cheat Lake, West Virginia, within the Northern District of West Virginia. In July 2014, a postal inspector notified Special Agent Branch of a burglary that had occurred at the Cheat Lake station on July 25, 2014. The total loss from the burglary was \$36,000.00. The same day Special Agent Branch learned of the burglary, he entered postal databases and found that fifty-seven (57) money orders had been cashed before they were reported as sold. That conduct had occurred between November 2013 and June 2014, with a total loss of \$12,424.35.00. Defendant was interviewed and was cooperative. She admitted to using the money order funds to give to a boyfriend who said he needed the money and would not accept "no" for an answer.

Defendant stated she succumbed to the pressure and later found out that the boyfriend had been using the money for drugs. Defendant disputed that she participated or had any knowledge of the burglary, and Special Agent Branch testified that nothing had been found to connect Defendant to the burglary. Defendant returned some of the outstanding money orders that she still had in her possession.

Defendant stated she heard, understood, and agreed with Special Agent Branch's testimony. From said testimony, the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes the offense charged in the Information is supported by an independent basis in fact concerning each of the essential elements of such offense.

Defendant, Samantha Christopher, with the consent of her counsel, Brian Kornbrath proceeded to enter a verbal plea of **GUILTY** to the felony charge contained in the Information.

Upon consideration of all of the above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea; Defendant is aware of and understood her right to have an Article III Judge hear and accept her plea and elected to voluntarily consent to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge hearing her plea; Defendant understood her right to have her charges presented in an Indictment and knowingly, freely and voluntarily elected to proceed by Information; Defendant understood the charges against her; Defendant understood the consequences of her plea of guilty, including the statutory maximum sentence; Defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to the Information; and Defendant's plea is independently supported by Special Agent Branch's testimony, which provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of each of the essential elements of the charge to which Defendant has pled guilty.

The undersigned Magistrate Judge therefore recommends Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge contained in the one-count Information herein be accepted conditioned upon the Court's receipt and review of this Report and Recommendation.

The undersigned further directs that a pre-sentence investigation report be prepared by the adult probation officer assigned to this case.

Defendant is released pursuant to the Order Setting Conditions of Release to be entered in this matter.

Any party may, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, file with the Clerk of the Court written objections identifying the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis for such objection. A copy of such objections should also be submitted to the Honorable Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections to the Report and Recommendation set forth above will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of this Court based upon such report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to counsel of record.

Respectfully submitted this 13<sup>th</sup> day of February, 2015.

*John S. Kaul*

JOHN S. KAULL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE